Author: K. P. Sinha
Publisher: Punthi-Pustak, Calcutta, 1997
The aim of this book is to discredit Srila A. C. Bhaktivedanta
Swami Prabhupada's presentation of the Vedic literature, and indirectly
the Gaudiya-Vedanta viewpoint. In its place, the author Dr K.P.
Sinha, professor of Sanskrit at Assam University, presents Neo-Vedanta
as the complete and authoritative solution to all philosophical
and hermeneutic problems in Indian philosophy. The term 'Neo-Vedanta'
refers to the loosely organised, relativistic system that attempts
to reconcile the views of all the Indian philosophical schools into
a single, coherent system. This system emerged primarily from the
teachings of the 19[th] century Hindu teacher Ramakrishna and others
like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan who popularised this trend of
thought in modern Hinduism.
Although Sinha never uses the term 'Neo-Vedanta' it is unmistakably
Sinha's book quotes two-hundred and fifty passages from Srila Prabhupada's
books, taken primarily from his commentaries on the Bhagavad-gita
and Sri Caitanya-caritamrta. In 16 chapters organised
by topic, they are subsequently addressed point by point from a
Neo-Vedantic perspective. Prabhupada's positions on Brahman, monism
(advaita), knowledge (jnana), devotion (bhakti),
illusion (vivarta-vada) and various heterodox schools are
challenged with an abundance of references to a wide range of Vedic
literature, secondary literature and their commentaries.
The central argument of the book is that Prabhupada has not really
understood the catholic viewpoint of the Vedic literature and has
consequently made many needless 'misinterpretations and unkind remarks'
against non-Vaisnava systems, particularly 'the Mayavadis'
teachers of Advaita and Neo-Vedanta. The book's stated purpose is
therefore 'to undertake the task of pointing out those misinterpretations
and giving the correct views of the relevant concepts of the systems
concerned ... to remove the evil effects these misinterpretations
and unkind remarks tend to create in the hearts of readers of Bhaktivedanta's
discourses.' His underlying
thesis is that Srila Prabhupada's books represent Vaisnava sectarianism
which needs to be re-evaluated in the light of an all-inclusive
The nature of Sinha's own Neo-Vedanta outlook itself is clarified
by viewing it in the context of Indian philosophical history. The
last millennium has seen many debates between the non-personal monistic
school (advaita) and the dualistic, personalistic (Vaisnava)
schools. While all sides agree that the ultimate reality called
Brahman is of one nature, the monistic school of advaita contends
that it is of a non-personal nature and that God's personality is
illusory and of secondary importance. On the other hand, each of
the personalistic Vaisnava schools describe Brahman as the intensely
personal being called Visnu, or Krsna, having an infinity of auspicious
attributes. In monism, God and the soul are identical, while in
dualism the difference is maintained even after liberation. The
monistic school has often enjoyed prestige as the primary Vedanta
school. However, throughout history, the Vaisnava schools have attempted
to demonstrate the coherency and strength of their devotional theology
on the basis of Vedic literature while criticising the monistic
two-tier theory of truth.
In response to this rich polemical tradition, the proponents of
Neo-Vedanta attempted to incorporate the advantages of both by artificially
combining the opposing conceptions into a single dual-natured Brahman.
Neo-Vedanta, they said, is the ultimate resolution to the advaita-versus-Vaisnava
controversy with the potential of becoming a universal philosophy.
Neo-Vedanta was then hailed as 'a grand ideal' of religious harmony
and the 'death-knell of all fanaticism, of all persecution with
the sword or with the pen'.
In his preface, Sinha announces his intention to demonstrate the
same ideal in the course of his analysis of Prabhupada's writings.
Specifically, Sinha's Neo-Vedanta accepts both the personal and
the non-personal aspects on equal footing in what has been described
as 'a many-faceted Personal-Impersonal Absolute Being'. Both principles
are said to coexist harmoniously like 'two sides of a coin'.
Using Ramakrishna's example, he says, 'Just as the same substance
may manifest itself as water or ice depending on the degree of temperature.'
Both exist with the same reality and validity with respect to two
different frames of reference. When one aspect (the personal natures
of God and the souls) is experienced, the other (the monistic aspect)
is not, and vice-versa. This
system is promoted by Neo-Vedantists as the real philosophy of the
Veda, and in its support Sinha cites both monistic and personalistic
Since all of Prabhupada's writings are critiqued consistently from
Sinha's perspective, it is useful to examine his Neo-Vedanta. The
most obvious problem with Sinha's presentation is its mishandling
of both monistic and Vaisnava texts.
Sri Caitanya (1486-1534) of the Vaisnava tradition has been blatantly
misrepresented. Although He accepted the reality of the monism,
He clearly rejected it as an object of meditation, or a goal of
spiritual life. Over-emphasis of the non-personal aspect covers
the spiritual opulences (cid-vibhuti) of the Lord in the
name of impersonalism (nirakara).
In that tradition Srila Prabhupada has faithfully rejected monism
as the goal of spiritual life. In his critique, however, Sinha in
effect pits Srila Prabhupada's views against those of Sri Caitanya,
whom he portrays as a Neo-Vedantist:
...the differences between Sankara and Sri Caitanya are very little
and negligible. Hence, Sri Caitanya's ruthless criticism of Sankara
should be explained as an extravagance guided by his strong desire
to redirect men pursuing the philosophical path of knowledge to
the emotional path of bhakti.
Sinha proceeds to misinterpret esoteric dualistic states of devotional
ecstasy in Gaudiya-Vaisnava literature like mahabhava and
prema-vilasa-vivarta as essentially non-personalistic experiences.
This attempt to support his dual-Brahman theory is unconvincing,
because the Gaudiya Vedanta commentary does not even refer to an
independent non-personal Brahman as envisaged in Neo-Vedanta. The
Gaudiya school does, however, acknowledge a non-personal effulgence
(called tejas or jyoti) resting entirely on the foundation
(pratistha) of God's personality.
The personal feature, however, is exalted as the highly concentrated
source of the non-personal Brahman.
Jiva Goswami, a contemporary follower of Sri Caitanya, however,
clarifies the personalism of Gaudiya philosophy: 'Bhagavan is, however,
the original feature of the Supreme, and Brahman is manifested at
a later time from the form of Bhagavan.'
Gaudiya Vaisnavas also cite the Bhagavata Purana, which relates
to us how Arjuna became aware of the non-personal effulgence (param
jyoti) as it emanated from the personal Brahman, clarifying
the actual relationship of these two aspects of Brahman.
Therefore, Sinha's presentation of Sri Caitanya and His followers
as Neo-Vedantists is misleading.
Sankara (788 ce), founder of the monistic (advaita) school,
has also been utterly misrepresented by Sinha, He states, 'The philosophy
of Sankara has two currents: When he speaks strictly as a philosopher,
he points his attention to the formless and qualityless Brahman
... when he speaks as a devotee, he directs his attention to the
divine beauty of ... the emotional Absolute. All this clearly shows
that Sankara accepts the existence of Purusottam Krsna, the Personal
Absolute'. This sort of
mispresentation of the monism of Sankara by other Neo-Vedantists
has drawn severe criticism from the Dvaita scholar B.N.K. Sharma,
whose comments are equally applicable to Sinha's presentation:
This picture is however far from being correct or true to Sankara's
own clear pronouncements in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya, or even
logically consistent. Sankara's pronouncements on the status of
Saguna and Nirguna Brahmans and the factual existence of the world
... give no support to any of the articles of faith of 'Neo-Vedanta'
[in which] the Saguna and Nirguna Brahmans have been placed on the
same par as the two sides of the same coin having the same reality
and validity. After crying down [Sankara's] two-tier theory of truth,
it is a surreptitious way of introducing it again by way of 'different
frames of reference'.
The idea of the Savisesa [personal] and Nirvisesa [non-personal]
Brahman both having the same reality and validity as the two sides
of the same coin or the vast liquidity of the Ocean and the solid
icebergs in another part has been severely criticised by Sankara
under his Vedanta commentary 2.1.14 (na canekatmakam). He
argues that the Supreme Brahman can never be anekatmakam
(double-sided) like the coin with two sides (as Neo-Vedanta wants
us to believe). Sankara thunders, 'Nonduality will have nothing
to do with accommodating difference of states of experience of Saguna
and Nirguna from different frames of reference at any time in its
being'(2.1.14). 'Brahman cannot be intrinsically double-natured
(na svata eva anekatmakam) as the two natures are diametrically
opposed to each other (virodha)...' Lastly, the Upanisadic
thesis of ekavijnanena satvavijnanam (knowing the many by
knowing the One) will be disproved and falsified, if it were true
that when the one [aspect of Brahman] is known the other is not.
Indeed, Sankara unambiguously denies a dual-natured Brahman and
condemns the devotional relation:
Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not at the
same time of an opposite nature ... Brahman does not possess double
characteristics although it is connected with limiting adjuncts.
Nor is it possible that Brahman should possess double characteristics
'on account of place'. ... If the conception of duality is once
uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again,
and so [it can] no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon
as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion.
It should also be noted that Sankara and the monists teach the
unique doctrine of illusionism (mithyatva) that, strictly
speaking, regards the world and individuality as completely illusory,
or non-existent. Neo-Vedanta, however, while liberally using the
language of the monists, sees them as merely temporary.
This dilution of illusionism from indicating unreality to a transient
reality clearly signals a departure from classical monistic metaphysics
Also common in the book is his frequent appeal to Sankara's discussion
in Vedanta-sutra 4.4.12 about how a liberated soul can animate
several bodies at once or live without a body. Using this, Sinha
tries to prove that Advaita philosophy accommodates his dual-natured
liberation and Brahman theory.
However, it is clear from context that those 'bodies' exist not
in spiritual perfection but only in the lower illusory (vyavaharika)
state of monistic philosophy.
Sinha's critique also fails to recognise the partial Vaisnava character
of even Sankara's major commentaries by proposing that the deities
Kali and Siva are also complete aspects of Brahman, in addition
to Visnu. However, in his unquestionably authentic works, Sankara
only identifies God (isvara) as Visnu, rather than as any
other deity. In his Gita commentary (13.2), isvara
is identified with Visnu: isvarasya visnoh. Another identification
occurs in Vedanta-sutra 2.2.42, where he accepts the Pancaratra
teaching that Narayana is 'higher than the undeveloped, the highest
Self and the Self of all' and is the source of innumerable expansions.
(See also similar acknowledgements in his comments to Vedanta-sutra
1.4.1, 1.4.3 and Gita 15.6.) The same idea is repeatedly
expressed in his exaltation of Visnu's abode as the pure highest
place (paramam padam) and as the end of the spiritual journey.
Even his commentary to the Svetasvatara Upanisad, with its
usage of the names 'Siva' and 'Hara', does not make any identification
of Isvara with the deity Siva. Furthermore, in his Vedanta
commentary, Sankara refutes certain concepts of ancient Pasupata
(Saiva) schools. Therefore, Sinha's presentation of Sankara acknowledging
an equality of various deities is misleading.
In summary, Sinha's approach is wrong and disingenuous, as it puts
Adi Sankara and his followers against each other on many fundamental
issues. The integrity of Sinha's approach to Sankara, therefore,
collapses in light of the foregoing evidences of his clearly monistic
Not only is Sinha's presentation of other acaryas inaccurate,
but his Neo-Vedanta philosophy itself has certain problems. He frequently
states that upon liberation, the soul 'may merge into the body of
the Absolute.' Specifically,
this concept of 'merging' or the literal dissolution of one's identity
into the non-personal Brahman closely resembles, as noted insightfully
by B.N.K. Sharma, that of ancient philosophy of bhedabheda. This
doctrine of 'difference non-difference' was rejected by all
the Vedanta schools. While
Vaisnava schools accept difference (bheda) and only a relative
oneness (abheda) or similarity between the soul and God,
this bhedabheda doctrine calls for an absolute oneness and
difference, as does Neo-Vedanta.
Specifically, the classical bhedabheda of Bhaskara holds
that bheda and abheda are sequential: the initially
distinct (bheda) infinitesimal soul can, upon liberation,
become identical to the unlimited Brahman (abheda). This
concept of spiritual mutability is fundamentally at odds with Vedic
philosophy since it indirectly challenges the infallibility of Brahman
by allowing for change, thereby dragging the pure Brahman conception
down into the gutter of imperfection.
This has been the perennial charge against bhedabheda, and
as a variant, Neo-Vedanta is also subject to the same criticism.
In addition to this sequential view, Sinha and other Neo-Vedantists
also accept both bheda and abheda in a different sense.
Sinha states the soul 'may merge into the body of the Absolute or
may retain its individuality, according to the self's choice or
liking'. Whichever 'choice' the soul makes, both bheda and
abheda are supposedly simultaneously operative in liberation,
the terms merely reflecting differences in perspective.
However, this attempt to project such a dual-natured liberation
theory into any Vaisnava-Vedanta is unacceptable, because the devotional
relation (bhakti) in such a system is compromised as insubstantial
and unreal in the monistic 'frame of reference'. This flaw is pointed
out by the Dvaita-Vaisnava-Vedantist Raghunatha Tirtha (1695-1742):
the bheda component of this bhedabheda-vada 'offers
no impediment to the jiva's intuiting the blessedness of
Brahman as his own, as [the difference] exists only in a rarefied
form in the state of liberation and is as good as non-existent.'
Thus, bhedabheda in both variants essentially rejects bheda
and the proper understanding of abheda, and, consequently,
the bhakti relation. Therefore, Neo-Vedanta, as a modern
form of bhedabheda is fundamentally hostile to pure devotion
(bhakti) and can never be consistent with any Vaisnava-Vedanta
After refuting some salient points of variants of bhedabheda
philosophy, the Sri Vaisnava acarya Ramanuja (1017-1137)
Brahman becomes, on this theory, subject to the evil of conjunction
with an infinite number of limiting conditions without any determinate
localisation of effects. There is no way of escaping this consequence.
The theory is only for the consumption of believers and can withstand
no open-minded inquiry. The wise, learned in the philosophical sciences,
do not have any esteem for it.
He goes so far as to indicate that bhedabheda and its variations
are more sinful than classical Advaita.
However that may be, Neo-Vedanta suffers from the same philosophical
Interestingly, Sinha's critique promotes Ramakrishna as a Vedantin,
even referring to him rather uncritically as an incarnation (avatara)
of God. Jeffrey J. Kripal's
intriguing work Kali's Child: The Mystical and The Erotic in
the Life and Teachings of Ramakrishna deconstructs the Ramakrishna
myth revealing little more than an unorthodox tantric sexuality
at the basis of his life, sayings, practices, and even literary
styles of his biographers.
In both the Tantra traditions and Neo-Vedanta, the Brahman conception
suffers from spiritual mutability since both traditions maintain
real individual can literally dissolve its identity into a monistic
perfection, as in the bhedabheda doctrine. For whatever reason,
Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and modern proponents like Sinha have never
bothered to address standing objections as they re-introduced the
concept of spiritual mutability.
Using his Neo-Vedantic prism, Sinha quotes and interprets passages
of Pancaratra literature to support his concept of dual-Brahman.
However, not only does Vaisnava personalism candidly dominate the
Pancaratra literature, but even terms like nirguna and sayujya,
commonly understood monistically, are defined in the Vaisnava
sense: 'Because [Brahman] has no contact with any ordinary qualities,
it is called nirguna. Listen, Narada, to the six [transcendental]
qualities.' 'He who has
become attached to the jewel of gems (maniratna, the kaustubha)
is said to have attained identity with the Lord' (Visnu-tilaka
2.45). 'Just as gold
in the midst of fire shines separately as though it were not in
contact (with the fire), even so he who is clinging to Brahman (Brahman-lagna)
is seen to exist in the form of a gem (mani)' (Visnu-tilaka
2.30). In the Padma-tantra (1.4.14-15), this very issue
is addressed: 'What is the difference, O Highest Spirit, between
Thee and the liberated soul?' The answer, starting off with a monistic
flavour, says, 'They (the liberated) become "I". There is no difference
whatsoever,' but ends by affirming plurality in perfection: 'As
I live (viharami), just so live the liberated souls.'
Such passages affirm the Vaisnava character of even the apparently
monistic statements of the Pancaratra.
In section thirteen, Sinha criticises Srila Prabhupada's explanation
of the spiritual nature of Lord Krsna's body. Specifically, Sinha
suggests that at the time of descent into this world, the transcendental
body of the Lord becomes embodied in a visually similar body of
flesh and blood. This interpretation is specifically rejected by
Vaisnava Vedantists, because it relies on an inapplicable and mundane
interpretation of 'sambhavami' (literally, 'I take birth')
of Bhagavad-gita 4.6. Even Sankaracarya, who ultimately rejects
all material and spiritual form as illusory, explains the word in
the proper way: 'I appear to become embodied (dehavan iva),
as though born (jata iva); ... but not in reality (na
paramarthato) like an ordinary man (lokavat).'
Similarly, another famous Advaitin, Sri Madhusudana Sarasvati, explicitly
states that Lord Krsna's body is made of eternity, knowledge and
bliss (sac-cid-ananda-ghana) and is manifested (avirbhavah)
even at the time of His birth (janmakale) (4.6, 7.24).
Interestingly, S. Radhakrishnan, another Neo-Vedantist, recognizing
this classical interpretation, rejected it as 'unsatisfactory',
offering the same mundane explanation of Krsna's which is repeated
Throughout his book, Sinha claims to champion the cause of pure
non-sectarian Vedanta, but even this claim is thrown into
question in his concluding sections (chapters 14-16) which attempt
to harmonise non-Vedic doctrines with Vedanta. For example,
the materialistic philosophy of Carvaka is presented as respectable
and conducive to morality and social harmony, despite clear pronouncements
by Lord Krsna to the contrary in Bhagavad-gita (16.8).
Then he presents and accedes to Buddhist arguments against Vedanta.
One such concession is the denial of the eternality of the Veda
in its linguistic format.
The universally accepted Vedanta viewpoint, however, is expressed
in the Brahmanda Purana: 'The Vedas are eternal, in
their entirety; are enduring, and present in the mind of Visnu;
at creation after creation, they are brought up as they are; with
the same order, same characters, and the same notes, never otherwise.'
Sinha also defends the Buddhist contention that their state of perfection
(sunya) is not merely an absolute void, but a state of positive
bliss. However, this overlooks the fact that the Buddhist definition
of sunya and Vedantic definition of asat (non-existence)
are, in fact, similar. Sinha
also accepts their view that the absolute truth lies midway between
nihilism (sunyavada) and eternalism (sasvatavada)
and, inaccurately, concludes that this final state is consistent
with Brahman realisation of Advaita. Thus, the philosophy of Sinha,
like those of Ramakrishna and other Neo-Vedantists before him, ultimately
accomodates materialism, impersonality, personality, nihilistic
void, and anything and everything else all in one relativistic
Ravindra-svarupa Dasa sums up the substance of Neo-Vedanta:
Those who have adopted traditional Advaita Vedanta to modern sorts
of relativism have introduced a change that we should note carefully.
... The thinkers who have 'deepened' Sankaracarya's relativism have
done away with an established illusion. No specific revelation carries
universal authority, even provisionally. As I once heard a college
girl say, expressing the popular rendition of this 'deepening':
'If you believe it's true, it's true for you.' Thus the modern,
deracinated individual becomes the author of reality, of creation.
He is now set free to believe in everything whatsoever precisely
because he believes in nothing at all.
Sinha's major criticism of Prabhupada's supposed misrepresentation
of others has several other bases. One possible source is that Srila
Prabhupada uses the term 'Mayavada' broadly to refer to both classical
monism of Sankara as well as Neo-Vedanta, since both see illusion
(maya) as a relatively independent principle. Therefore,
each of his criticisms of 'Mayavada' do not necessarily apply to
both types. Another possible source is how Srila Prabhupada not
only criticises the face-value of monism but also for what is, in
his view, its logical extensions and indirect results like materialism.
In fact, the Bhagavad-gita (12.5) affirms the relative difficulty
of meditation on the non-personal aura of Brahman, and the failure
in this path naturally results in materialism. Another cause of
misgivings is Srila Prabhupada's writing style, which is spiced
with humour, sarcasm, and contemporary socio-religious criticism.
In particular, his sharp remarks against very reputable philosophical
opponents like Sankara, Vivekananda, and Radhakrishnan are criticised
by Sinha as 'unparliamentary'.
However, when seen in context, these remarks shatter the sentimentalism
of secular religion and provoke analytical thought in his readers.
It should be noted that Srila Prabhupada was personally very respectful
to all his opponents including Radhakrishnan.
Sinha validly notes several minor points in Srila Prabhupada's
books. One is the latter's reference to Sankara as equating Lord
Sankarsana with the individual soul (jiva) in his Vedanta-sutra
2.2.42 commentary. Although
Sankara here draws no equation between the two alternate referents,
it is a natural conclusion of monism and Srila Prabhupada's ensuing
argument against this conclusion is generally applicable. In another
case, the definitions of vikara and vivarta used to
explain the theory of transformation (parinama-vada) is incorrectly
attributed to the Vedanta-sutra. However, these definitions
are general and accepted by all Vedanta schools, and therefore Srila
Prabhupada's use of them is valid.
These instances do not detract from Srila Prabhupada's overall presentation
of the Vaisnava viewpoint.
In summary, Sinha's critique of Srila Prabhupada's works amounts
to a presentation of the relativistic Neo-Vedanta outlook with its
underlying hostility towards the fundamental truth of bhakti
as well as Vedanta. Although he ambitiously cites an impressive
array of Vedic and Saivite texts, he disingenuously invokes the
names of Sankaracarya and Sri Caitanya to support his philosophy
and, like others before him, fails to address the universal objections
to spiritual mutability. Nevertheless, this Neo-Vedantic challenge
to Vaisnavism will be of interest to ISKCON devotees currently involved
in dialogue with adherents of modern Hindu philosophy.
 Swami Tapasyananda, Bhakti Schools of
Vedanta (Madras, Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1990), xxiii.
 Sinha, P., Critique of A.C. Bhaktivedanta,
(Calcutta: Punthi-pustak, 1995), p. vii.
 Vivekananda quoted in Tapasyananda, p. 356.
 Tapasyananda, p. xxxiii.
 Sinha, p. 36. Ramakrishna uses the example
in the same way (Tapasyananda, p. 364).
 Sinha, p. 35.
 Sri Caitanya-caritamrta, Adi-lila 7.122.
 Sinha, p. 138.
 Sinha, p. 94.
 Bhagavad-gita 14.27, Srimad-Bhagavatam
1.2.11, Harivamsa cited in Srimad-Bhagavatam 10.89.51p.
 Vireswarananda Swami. Srimad Bhagavad-gita
with the gloss of Sridhara Swami (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math,
 Kusakratha Dasa, Jiva Goswami's Bhagavata-sandarbha
(Alachua: Krsna Institute, 1995), Anuccheda 7.
 Harivamsa cited in Srimad-Bhagavatam
 Sinha, p. 34.
 Sharma, B.N.K., (a) Advaitasiddhi vs.
Nyayamrta: an up-to-date critical reappraisal, Part 1 (Bangalore:
Anandatirtha Pratisthana of the Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandal,
1994), p. xxiii.
 Sharma (a), pp. xxiv-xxv
 Thibaut, G. Vedanta-sutras with
the commentary by Sankaracarya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers,
1998) 3.2.11; 1.1.4.
 Sinha criticises Prabhupada's understanding
of both the monistic and Vaisnava understandings of vivarta-vada
and instead offers his own Neo-Vedantic view (See pp. 181, 200).
Sinha, p. 95.
 Ghate, V.S. The Vedanta: A study of the
Brahma-sutras with the bhasyas of Sankara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka,
Madhva, and Vallabha (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
 In Vedanta-sutra 4.3.10, Sankaracarya
refers to Visnu's abode as the highest 'the souls proceed
to what is higher than [the world of Brahma], i.e. to the pure highest
place of Visnu' (param parisuddham visnoh paramam padam pratipadyante).
See also the similar references in his comments to 1.4.1-4, 3.3.15.
Sinha, p. 82.
 All Vedantists criticise an aspect of bhedabheda
in their comments to Vedanta-sutra 2.3.41. See Nimbarka's
Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, Madhva's Sutra-bhasya,
Ramanuja's Sri-bhasya, and Baladeva's Govinda-bhasya.
 Raghavachar, S.S., Vedartha-sangraha of
Ramanujacarya (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1978), verse
 Sinha, p. 34.
 trtiye muktau bhedasadbhave'pi nanusandhanapratibandhah,
tadanim bhedasya dagdhapatayamanatvena jivanmuktavantah karanasyevasatkalpatvata
Raghunatha Tirtha's Vedanta-sutra 3.2.18 from
Sharma, B.N.K. (b) The Brahma-sutras and Their Principal Commentaries
2[nd] ed. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1986) Volume 3, p. 99.
 Vedartha-sangraha, verse 73.
 brahmajnanavadad api papiyan ayam bhedabhedapaksakVedartha-sangraha
cited in Sharma (a), p. xxv.
 Sinha, p. 220.
 Kripal, J., Kali's Child: the mystical
and the erotic in the life and teachings of Ramakrishna, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.
 Matsubara, M. The Early Pancaratra-samhitas
and the Ahirbudhnya-samhita (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994),
177. aprakrtagunasparsam nirgunam parigiyate srnu narada sadgunyam
Ahirbudhnya samhita 2.55
 mani ratne vilagnasya sayujya gatirucyate
(cited in Schrader, F. O., Introduction to the Pancaratra
and the Ahirbudhnya-samhita, (Madras: Adyar Library and Research
Centre, 1973), p. 105.
 Schrader, pp. 104-5.
 Radhakrishnan, S. The Bhagavad-gita
(New Delhi: Indus, 1993); and Gambhirananda, Swami, Bhagavad-gita
with the commentary of Sankaracarya (Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama,
 Srimad Bhagavad-gita with Sri Madhusudana
Sarasvati's Gudartha-dipika and Sridhara Swami's Subodhini (Poona:
Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, volume 45, 1901).
 See Sinha, 240. Sridhara Swami identifies
the demonic outlook of Gita 16.8 with Carvaka philosophy
 Sinha, p. 288.
 nitya vedah samastasca sasvatah visnu-buddhigah
| sarge sarge amunaiveta udgiryante tathaiva ca | tatkramenaiva
tairvarnaih taih svaraireva na chanyatha | Brahmanda Purana,
cited by Madhvacarya in his Visnu-tattva-vinirnaya.
 Sharma (b), volume 2, p. 71.
 Ravindra-svarupa Dasa, 'A Response to Hinduism
in Interreligious Dialogue', in ISKCON Communications Journal,
Vol. 4, No. 2 (December 1996).
 Sinha, pp. 132-3.
 Sinha, p. 221; Srila Prabhupada refers to
Sankaracarya as 'a pseudo-gentle man' (Caitanya-caritamrta, Madhya-lila
6.172), Vivekananda 'a so-called svami who did not know
anything about Vedanta' (Sri Caitanya-caritamrta, Adi-lila
7.103), and Radhakrishnan 'the so-called greatest philosopher'
(Prabhupada, Sword of Knowledge, (Bhaktivedanta Book Trust:
1988), 170) which elicits Sinha's disapproval (See pp. 201, 81,
 Sri Caitanya-caritamrta, Adi-lila 5.41p.
 Sri Caitanya-caritamrta, Adi-lila 7.121p-122p.
The Advaitin Sadananda Yogindra cites the same definitions, without
reference, in his Vedanta-sara (138). Nikhilananda, S., (Calcutta:
Advaita Ashrama, 1968).